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One  way  to  construe  subjectivism  about  well-being  is  as  the  view  that  x  is  basically  good  for  S  if  
and  only  if,  because,  and  to  the  extent  that  x  is  valued,  under  the  proper  conditions,  by  S .   Dale  2
Dorsey  argues  for  an  idealized,  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing,  one  according  to  which  a  
person  values  a  thing  if  and  only  if,  because,  and  to  the  extent  that  she  would  believe,  under  the  
proper  conditions,  that  it  is  basically  good  for  herself.   Call  subjectivism  about  well-being  3
coupled  with  a  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  judgment  subjectivism .  4
  Judgment  subjectivism  is  a  remarkable  theory,  and  Dorsey’s  case  for  it  is  compelling.  If  
the  theory  is  true,  then  what  is  good  for  you  is  wholly  determined  by  what  you  believe  is  good  
1  I  presented  earlier  versions  of  this  paper  at  the  University  of  Colorado  Boulder  on  three  di erent  
occasions:  as  a  Graduate  Work-in-Progress  Talk,  as  a  talk  to  the  undergraduate  philosophy  club,  and  as  a  
talk  to  the  participants  of  the  2017  Colorado  Summer  Seminar  in  Philosophy.  I  am  grateful  to  those  
audiences  for  helpful  feedback.  Early  work  on  the  paper  was  supported  by  funding  from  the  Centre  for  
Moral  and  Political  Philosophy  at  the  Hebrew  University  of  Jerusalem.  I  am  grateful  for  that  support.  
For  helpful  comments  on  earlier  drafts,  I  thank  Teresa  Bruno,  Dale  Dorsey,  Nikki  Fortier,  Chris  
Heathwood,  Michael  Huemer,  Eden  Lin,  Rebecca  Mullen,  Graham  Oddie,  and  three  anonymous  
referees  for  this  journal.  
2  This  construal  is  Dale  Dorsey's.  See  Dorsey  2012,  p.  407.  One  controversial  feature  of  Dorsey’s  
statement  of  subjectivism  is  that  it  requires  that  a  theory  link  a  person’s  good  to  her  values  in  order  for  it  
to  count  as  subjectivist.  It  is  more  common  in  the  well-being  literature  to  deem  as  subjectivist  any  
theory  that  links  a  person’s  good  to  her  pro-attitudes  more  generally  (and  not  only  to  the  pro-attitudes  
that  constitute  her  values).  See,  for  example,  Heathwood  2014,  p.  205;  Lin  2017,  p.  354;  and  Sumner  
1996,  p.  38.  
3  See  Dorsey  2012,  2017a,  and  2017b.   
4  Each  theory—subjectivism,  a  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing,  and  judgment  
subjectivism—includes  “because,”  “to  the  extent  that,”  and  “under  the  proper  conditions”  clauses.  To  
make  the  discussion  less  onerous,  I  will  mostly  drop  these  clauses  when  discussing  these  theories.  Also,  
in  what  follows,  all  references  to  welfare  value  or  to  what  is  good  (bad)  for  a  person  are  references  to  
what  is  basically  good  (bad)  for  a  person  (i.e.,  good  (bad)  for  the  person  non-derivatively  and  as  an  end).  
 
 for  you.  It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  it  has  not  been  the  subject  of  much  scrutiny.   In  this  5
paper,  I  o er  three  related  arguments  against  the  theory.  The  arguments  are  about  what  
judgment  subjectivism  implies  about  the  well-being  of  welfare  nihilists,  people  who  believe  
that  there  aren’t  any  welfare  properties  or  at  least  that  none  are  instantiated.  I  maintain  that  
welfare  nihilists  can  be  bene ted  and  harmed.  Judgment  subjectivism  is  implausible  because  it  
implies  otherwise.  
In  section  one,  I  explain  judgment  subjectivism,  and  in  section  two,  I  present  the  
welfare-nihilist  arguments  against  the  theory.  In  section  three,  I  explain  how  my  objection  to  
the  theory  is  better,  in  at  least  one  important  respect,  than  a  similar  objection  in  the  well-being  
literature.  In  section  four,  I  respond  to  some  objections.  
 
1.  Judgment  Subjectivism  
The  central  motivation  for  judgment  subjectivism  is  the  alienation  constraint,  the  doctrine  
that  a  person  cannot  be  alienated  from  that  which  is  basically  good  for  her.  Sometimes  referred  
to  as  “internalism  about  prudential  value”  or  “the  resonance  constraint,”  it  is  commonly  
understood  as  the  requirement  that  in  order  for  something  to  be  good  for  a  person,  she  must  
have  a  pro-attitude  towards  it.   A  person’s  pro-attitudes  are  her  non-cognitive  attitudes  like  6
being  pleased,  desiring,  enjoying,  and  liking  or  her  evaluative  cognitive  attitudes  like  believing  
5  Lin  2017  is  an  important  exception.  
6  In  a  canonical  expression  of  the  resonance  constraint,  Railton  writes:  “It  does  seem  to  me  to  capture  
an  important  feature  of  the  concept  of  intrinsic  value  to  say  that  what  is  intrinsically  valuable  for  a  
person  must  have  a  connection  with  what  he  would   nd  in  some  degree  compelling  or  attractive,  at  
least  if  he  were  rational  and  aware.  It  would  be  an  intolerably  alienated  conception  of  someone’s  good  
to  imagine  that  it  might  fail  in  any  such  way  to  engage  him”  (Railton  1986,  p.  9).  See  Rosati  1996  and  
Dorsey  2017b  for  arguments  in  favor  of  the  resonance  constraint.  See  Dorsey  2017b  and  Sarch  2011  for  
criticisms  of  Rosati’s  arguments.  Sarch  2011  also  contains  an  argument  against  Rosati’s  preferred  
formulation  of  the  constraint.  
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 that  something  is  of  value.   The  alienation  constraint  is  motivated  by  cases  where  it  seems  at  7
least  plausible  to  say  that  something  isn’t  good  for  a  person  because  the  person  is  not  at  all  
interested  in  it.  
  From  this  starting  point,  Dorsey  arrives  at  judgment  subjectivism  in  two  steps.  The  
 rst  step  is  to  argue  that,  in  order  to  accommodate  our  intuitions  about  how  a  person’s  good  
cannot  be  alien  to  her—that  is,  in  order  to  accommodate  the  alienation  constraint—theories  of  
well-being  must  tie  a  person’s  good  to  the  pro-attitudes  that  constitute  her  values  and  not  just  
to  any  pro-attitude  or  other.  Dorsey  claims  that  a  theory  that  ties  a  person’s  good  to  some  
pro-attitude  that  is  not  a  valuing  attitude  risks  alienating  a  person  from  her  good.   The  8
argument  for  this  claim  appeals  to  the  case  of  a  recovering  addict  who  desires,  but  does  not  
value,  taking  an  addictive  drug.  It  would  be  to  adopt  an  intolerably  alienating  conception  of  
her  good,  Dorsey  claims,  to  say  that  taking  the  addictive  drug  is  good  for  her  when  doing  so  
con icts  with  her  values.  9
The  second  step  is  to  give  a  theory  of  valuing.   A  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  10
identi es  valuing  with  belief  or  judgment  (I’ll  use  the  two  interchangeably).  The  theory  says  
that  S  values  x  if  and  only  if  S  believes,  under  the  proper  conditions,  that  x  is  good  for  S .  There  
are  some  troubling  cases  for  the  theory.  There  are  two  that  I’ll  mention  here.   
7  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  I  will  follow  Dorsey  (2012)  in  characterizing  evaluative  beliefs  as  
pro-attitudes.  
8  A  valuing  attitude  is  an  attitude  such  that  if  a  person  takes  up  that  attitude  towards  an  object,  then  she  
values  it.   
9  See  Dorsey  2017a,  pp.  200-201.   
10  More  speci cally,  Dorsey  takes  himself  to  be  giving  a  theory  of  prudential  valuing.  According  to  
Dorsey,  prudential  valuing  is  the  kind  of  valuing  that  is  self-interested  and  thereby  most  plausibly  related  
to  well-being.  For  example,  Dorsey  distinguishes  between  the  way  that  he  might  value  a  stranger’s  
broken  leg  being  healed  and  the  way  he  values  being  a  philosopher.  He  says  that  he  values  the  former  in  
a  nonprudential  way  and  that  he  values  the  latter  in  a  di erent,  prudential  way.  See  Dorsey  2012,  p.  
419-422.   
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 Suppose  that  some  of  my  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  me  are  in  tension  with  some  of  
my  other  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  me.  For  example,  suppose  that  I  believe  that  being  a  
philosopher  is  good  for  me,  but  I  don’t  believe  that  the  activities  that  are  constitutive  of  being  a  
philosopher  are  good  for  me.  Plausibly,  if  one  does  not  value  the  activities  constitutive  of  being  
a  philosopher,  one  does  not  value  being  a  philosopher.  Thus,  the  judgment-based  theory  of  
valuing  seems  to  imply,  implausibly,  that  I  both  value  and  do  not  value  being  a  philosopher.  11
Another  problem  case  is  this:  suppose  that  I  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  
for  me,  but  I  have  a  mistaken  view  of  what  being  a  philosopher  is  like.  Suppose  further  that  if  I  
knew  what  being  a  philosopher  is  really  like,  I  wouldn’t  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  
good  for  me.  Perhaps,  for  example,  I  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  for  me  on  the  
basis  of  the  prospects  of  the  fortune  and  fame  I  associate  with  being  a  philosopher,  and  that  I  
wouldn’t  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  for  me  if  it  weren’t  for  this  mistaken  view  of  
what  being  a  philosopher  is  like.  The  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  seems  to  imply,  
implausibly,  that  I  value  being  a  philosopher  when  I  don’t  value  what  it’s  really  like  to  be  a  
philosopher  (philosophy,  perhaps  regrettably,  is  not  a  reliable  path  to  fortune  and  fame).  
We  can  specify  the  theory  in  a  way  that  avoids  these  objections.  The  theory  says  that  S ’s  
beliefs  determine,  under  the  proper  conditions ,  what  S  values.  Dorsey  suggests  that  the  proper  
conditions  include  a  coherence  condition.   In  the  case  where  I  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  12
is  good  for  me,  and  I  also  believe  that  doing  the  activities  that  are  constitutive  of  being  a  
philosopher  is  not  good  for  me,  my  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  me  are  incoherent.  Once  my  
beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  me  are  rendered  coherent,  I’ll  either  believe  both  that  being  a  
11  Ibid.,  p.  415.   
12  Ibid.,  pp.  415-416.   
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 philosopher  and  that  the  activities  constitutive  of  being  a  philosopher  are  good  for  me  or  I  
won’t  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  for  me  at  all.   
What  of  the  case  where  I  believe  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  for  me  but  on  the  
basis  of  a  misunderstanding  of  what  being  a  philosopher  is  like?  To  accommodate  this  kind  of  
case,  Dorsey  speci es  the  theory’s  proper-conditions  clause  to  include  a  condition  of  full  
consideration.   Provided  that  I  wouldn’t  maintain  my  belief  that  being  a  philosopher  is  good  13
for  me  if  I  had  fully  considered  the  relevant  ways  that  being  a  philosopher  is  like,  then  the  
judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  that  includes  a  condition  of  full  consideration  would  not  
imply  that  I  value  being  a  philosopher.  
With  these  details,  we  can  now  state  Dorsey’s  preferred  formulation  of  judgment  
subjectivism:  
Dorsey-style  Judgment  Subjectivism :   x  is  good  for  S  if  and  only  if  S  would   
  believe,  if  S ’s  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for   
S  were  rendered  coherent  and  if  S  had  fully   
considered  all  the  (relevant)  ways  that  x  might  
be,  that  x  is  good  for  S .   
 
The  core  of  judgment  subjectivism  is  a  commitment  to  subjectivism  and  a  judgment-based  
theory  of  valuing.  Dorsey-style  judgment  subjectivism  is  one  way  to  specify  the  theory’s  
proper-conditions  clause  in  light  of  the  two  problem  cases  just  discussed.  Dorsey's  formulation  
of  the  theory  is  an  idealized  theory.  It  doesn’t  give  the  person’s  actual  beliefs  evaluative  
authority.  Instead,  whether  x  is  good  for  S  is  determined  by  the  beliefs  that  S  would  have  if  her  
beliefs  were  rendered  coherent  and  if  she  had  fully  considered  all  the  (relevant)  ways  that  x  
13  Dorsey  2017a,  p.  209.   
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 might  be.  Other  judgment  subjectivists  may  wish  to  avoid  idealization.   The  welfare-nihilist  14
arguments  against  judgment  subjectivism,  however,  apply  not  just  to  Dorsey’s  particular  
formulation  of  the  theory.  They  apply  to  any  plausible  version  of  the  theory.   
 
2.  The  Welfare-Nihilist  Arguments  
Welfare  nihilism  is  the  view  that  there  are  no  welfare  properties  or  at  least  that  none  are  
instantiated.   Judgment  subjectivism  has  some  implausible  implications  about  the  welfare  of  
welfare  nihilists.  I’ll  discuss  three:  that  welfare  nihilists  cannot  be  bene ted,  that  welfare  
nihilists  cannot  be  harmed,  and  that  for  any  two  welfare  nihilists,  A  and  B ,  the  segment  of  A ’s  
life  after  A  becomes  a  welfare  nihilist  is  no  better  or  worse  for  A  than  the  corresponding  
segment  of  B ’s  life,  no  matter  what  these  life  segments  are  like .   
 
2.1  The  ﬁrst  argument  
Suppose  that  Felicity  is  a  senior  philosophy  professor.  In  graduate  school,  she  took  a  seminar  in  
the  metaphysics  of  value.  She  became  convinced  by  various  arguments  that  nothing  is  good  or  
bad  for  anyone.  After  becoming  a  welfare  nihilist,  Felicity  nonetheless  experienced  numerous  
pleasures  and  the  satisfaction  of  her  most  enduring  desires.  She  married  a  lovely  and  kind  
14  Dorsey  distinguishes  between  two  ways  that  idealization  might  be  incorporated  into  subjectivism.  On  
Dorsey’s  understanding  of  subjectivism,  the  subjectivist  says  that  something  is  good  for  a  person  if  and  
only  if  she  values  it.  The   rst  way  that  idealization  could  enter  the  subjectivist  picture  would  be  for  the  
subjectivist  to  say  that  it’s  not  the  person’s  actual  values  that  determine  what  is  good  for  her;  instead,  
it’s  the  values  that  she  would  have  if  she  were,  say,  fully  informed  and  fully  rational.  Now  suppose  that  
the  subjectivist  does  not  choose  to  idealize  in  this  way.  There  is  still  a  second  way  that  idealization  could  
enter  the  picture:  the  subjectivist  might  say  that  what  it  is  for  a  person  to  value  something  is  for  her  to  
have  certain  pro-attitudes  under  certain  idealized  conditions.  Dorsey  chooses  to  idealize  in  the  second,  
but  not  the   rst  way;  on  his  view,  it’s  a  person’s  actual  values  that  determine  what  is  good  for  her,  but  
her  actual  values  are  revealed  through  what  she  would  believe  is  good  for  herself  under  idealized  
conditions.  See  Dorsey  2017a.   
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 person  with  whom  she  is  exceptionally  happy.  She  loves  her  children,  and  they  love  her.  She  has  
published  widely  in  philosophy.  She  has  developed  her  musical  talent  as  an  expert  pianist.  She  
donates  money  to  the  poor,  and  she  has  a  wide  range  of  hobbies  in  which  she  often   nds  
occasion  to  indulge.  She  is  well  respected,  and  she  has  many  genuine  friendships.  At  the  age  of  
85,  Felicity  dies  just  as  she  had  always  hoped  that  she  would:  painlessly  and  surrounded  by  her  
loved  ones.   
It  is  plain  that  Felicity  led  a  good  life.  Furthermore,  it’s  not  that  the  goodness  of  
Felicity’s  life  is  wholly  explained  by  what  occurred  in  her  life  before  she  became  a  welfare  
nihilist.  The  goodness  of  Felicity’s  life  is  explained,  at  least  in  part,  by  states  of  a airs  that  
obtained  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.   Note  that  we  need  not  agree  on  which  states  of  15
a airs  are  good  for  Felicity  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist,  and  we  need  not  agree  on  exactly  
why  they  were  of  bene t  to  her.  I  take  it  that  virtually  everyone,  irrespective  of  their  preferred  
theory  of  well-being,  would  agree  that  Felicity  was  bene ted  by  at  least  something  after  she  
became  a  welfare  nihilist.   
Dorsey-style  judgment  subjectivism,  however,  cannot  accommodate  this  fact.  The  
theory  implies  that  x  is  good  for  S  only  if  S  would  believe,  if  her  beliefs  were  rendered  coherent  
and  if  she  had  fully  considered  all  the  (relevant)  ways  that  x  might  be,  that  x  is  good  for  S .  
Felicity’s  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  herself  are  consistent  because  she  doesn’t  believe  that  
anything  is  good  for  herself.  There  is  also  no  di culty  in  imagining  that  the  full-consideration  
condition  has  been  met.  We  can  imagine  that  Felicity  remained  steadfast  in  her  welfare  nihilism  
15  For  simplicity,  I  am  writing  as  if  states  of  a airs  are  the  bearers  of  prudential  value,  but  I  want  to  
remain  neutral  on  this  controversial  issue.  Everything  I  say  here  could  be  restated  in  terms  of  whichever  
metaphysical  entity  one  thinks  is  the  bearer  of  welfare  value.   
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 even  after  fully  considering  every  possible  state  of  a airs  that  might  be  of  bene t  to  her.  Thus,  
Dorsey-style  judgment  subjectivism  implies,  implausibly,  that  Felicity  wasn’t  bene ted  after  
she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.   
This   rst  welfare-nihilist  argument,  like  the  other  two  to  follow,  are  not  just  a  problem  
for  Dorsey-style  judgment  subjectivism.  Dorsey’s  formulation  of  the  theory  is  a  result  of  his  
preferred  way  of  specifying  the  theory’s  proper-conditions  clause.  I  will  argue  in  section  four  
that  Felicity  wouldn’t  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself  after  she  became  a  welfare  
nihilist  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  theory’s  proper-conditions  clause.  My  
argument  there  relies  on  the  claim  that  some  natural  and  plausible  ways  the  judgment  
subjectivist  might  try  to  specify  the  proper-conditions  clause  to  avoid  my  objection  are  
inadequate  for  that  task.  This  fact  suggests  (but,  of  course,  does  not  entail)  that  there  is  no  
plausible  way  at  all  for  the  judgment  subjectivist  to  specify  the  proper-conditions  clause  in  
order  to  avoid  my  objection.    
   One  initial  objection  to  this   rst  argument  is  that  I  have  begged  the  question  against  
the  judgment  subjectivist.  Only  someone  who  is  not  a  judgment  subjectivist,  the  objector  
claims,  would  grant  that  Felicity  is  bene ted  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.  I  suspect,  
however,  that  if  the  judgment  subjectivist  puts  aside  his  philosophical  commitments  and  
re ects  on  the  case  as  anyone  else  would,  he  would  agree  that  Felicity  is  bene ted  after  
becoming  a  welfare  nihilist.  Furthermore,  the  judgment  subjectivist  should  be  concerned  to  
accommodate  common-sense  intuitions  about  welfare,  and  not  just  the  idiosyncratic  intuitions  
of  judgment  subjectivists.   
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   Even  if  the  judgment  subjectivist  digs  in  his  heels  and  insists  that  Felicity  is  never  
bene ted  after  becoming  a  welfare  nihilist,  I  do  not  think  that  my  argument  begs  the  question  
(or  if  it  does,  it  is  not  an  illicit  instance  of  begging  the  question).  I  doubt,  for  example,  that  
anyone  would  seriously  think  that  Gettier  begs  the  question  (or  that  his  begging  the  question  is  
illicit)  against  the  justi ed-true-belief  theory  of  knowledge  just  because  he  assumes  as  a  premise  
something  that  someone  who  digs  in  his  heels  and  insists  that  the  theory  is  true  would  reject  
(e.g.,  that  Smith  does  not  know  that  the  man  who  will  get  the  job  has  10  coins  in  his  pocket).  16
The  issue  of  when  an  argument  begs  the  question  (illicitly)  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper,  
but  we  can  at  least  say  this:  an  expansive  view  according  to  which  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments  
should  be  rejected  on  this  basis  is  one  that  would  condemn  as  fallacious  virtually  every  
philosophical  argument  that  attempts  to  make  problems  for  a  theory  by  identifying  its  
implausible  implications.   17
 
 
2.2  The  second  argument  
Judgment  subjectivism  is  a  theory  of  well-being.  Theories  of  well-being  are  theories  about  what  
is  good  for  a  person  as  well  as  what  is  bad  for  a  person.  For  example,  the  hedonist  claims  that  
pleasurable  experiences  bene t  a  person  whereas  painful  experiences  harm.  Similarly,  we  would  
expect  a  full  statement  of  judgment  subjectivism  to  say  something  about  what  is  bad  for  a  
person.  Dorsey  does  not  discuss  this  element  of  the  theory,  so  we  must   ll  in  some  of  the  details  
for  ourselves.  The  most  natural  suggestion  is  for  the  judgment  subjectivist  to  say  that  x  is  bad  
for  S  if  and  only  if  S  would  believe,  under  the  proper  conditions,  that  x  is  bad  for  S .  
16  Gettier  1963.   
17  I  thank  an  anonymous  referee  for  pressing  me  on  this  point.   
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 This  additional  feature  of  judgment  subjectivism  suggests  a  di erent  but  related  
argument  against  the  theory.  Suppose  that  Mallory  is  a  prisoner  at  a  top-secret  government  
compound.  She  is  tortured  daily.  She  has  numerous  painful  experiences  and  her  life  is  full  of  
the  frustration  of  her  most  enduring  desires.  Before  her  imprisonment,  Mallory  took  a  seminar  
in  the  metaphysics  of  value  in  graduate  school.  She  became  convinced  by  various  arguments  
that  nothing  is  good  or  bad  for  anyone.  Mallory  had  many  friends  that  have  since  lost  all  
respect  and  a ection  for  her  after  learning  of  her  imprisonment  for  suspected  terrorist  activity.  
Upon  her  capture,  Mallory’s  lovely  and  kind  partner—with  whom  she  was  previously  
exceptionally  happy—divorced  her.  Her  children  despise  her,  and  she  has  no  opportunity  to  
pursue  the  various  projects  that  are  important  to  her.  She  has  no  hobbies  and  no  genuine  
friendships.  Mallory  never  again  sees  the  light  of  day  and  dies  at  the  hands  of  her  captors.   
It  seems  plain  that  Mallory  is  harmed  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.  After  all,  it’s  
not  as  if  a  person  could  avoid  the  harm  of  being  tortured  simply  by  convincing  themselves  of  
welfare  nihilism.  Even  if  we  cannot  agree  as  to  exactly  what  is  bad  for  her  after  she  became  a  
welfare  nihilist  or  exactly  why  it  is  bad  for  her,  surely  we  can  all  agree,  irrespective  of  our  
preferred  theory  of  well-being,  that  Mallory  was  harmed  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.   
Dorsey-style  judgment  subjectivism  cannot  accommodate  this  fact.  Mallory’s  beliefs  
about  what  is  bad  for  herself  are  coherent  because  she  doesn’t  believe  that  anything  is  bad  for  
herself,  and  we  can  simply  imagine  that  the  full  consideration  condition  has  been  met  as  well.  
Furthermore,  Mallory  would  not,  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  proper-conditions  
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 clause,  believe  that  anything  is  bad  for  herself,  so  this  second  welfare-nihilist  argument,  like  the  
others,  is  a  problem  for  any  version  of  the  theory.  18
   
2.3  The  third  argument  
 
I  want  to  highlight  one  additional  implausible  implication  of  judgment  subjectivism.  To  put  
the  argument  roughly:  when  I  re ect  on  Felicity’s  life  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist,  I   nd  
myself  thinking  that  this  period  of  Felicity’s  life  is  going  by  far  better  for  her  than  the  
corresponding  period  of  Mallory’s  life  is  going  for  her.  The  problem  for  judgment  subjectivism  
is  that  it  seems  unable  to  accommodate  this  intuitive  thought.  As  I  will  explain,  the  theory  
implies  that  Felicity’s  life  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist  is  of  equal  welfare  value  for  her  as  
Mallory’s  life  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist  is  for  her.  
For  the  discussion  that  follows,  it  will  be  helpful  to  introduce  some  terminology  for  
ease  of  reference.  Let’s  call  the  period  of  Felicity’s  life  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist  
Felicitous  and  the  corresponding  period  of  Mallory’s  life  Maladious .  It  seems  to  clear  to  me  
that  Felicitous  is  better  for  Felicity  than  Maladious  is  for  Mallory.  In  fact,  I  have  a  strong  
intuition  that  Felicitous  is  signiﬁcantly  better  for  Felicity  than  Maladious  is  for  Mallory.  
Perhaps  you  share  this  intuition.  But  the  claim  we  need  for  the  third  welfare-nihilist  argument  
is  weaker;  all  we  have  to  say  is  that  Felicitous  is  at  least  somewhat  better  for  Felicity  than  
Maladious  is  for  Mallory.  Everyone,  irrespective  of  their  preferred  theory  of  well-being,  should  
accept  this  weaker  claim.  Imagine  that  you  are  Felicity  in  the  moment  immediately  after  she  
18  In  section  4.2,  I  argue  that  Felicity  wouldn’t,  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  
proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.  I  trust  that  the  reader  can  take  what  I  
say  there,  make  the  appropriate  changes,  and  reason  in  the  same  fashion  to  the  conclusion  that  Mallory  
also  would  not,  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  anything  
is  bad  for  herself.   
11 
 became  a  welfare  nihilist.  Now  suppose  that  you  could  choose,  only  taking  into  account  
considerations  of  your  own  welfare,  either  Felicitous  or  Maladious  as  your  future.  Surely  you  
should  not  be  indi erent  between  these  two  options;  Felicitous  is  preferrable  precisely  because  
it  is  the  future  that  would  be  better  for  you.   
Judgment  subjectivism  cannot  accommodate  this  simple  fact.  There  are  two  di erent  
versions  of  judgment  subjectivism  that  we  have  to  consider,  each  corresponding  to  a  di erence  
with  respect  to  what  the  theory  might  say  about  how  we  should  evaluate  the  welfare  value  of  
one  of  S ’s  life  segments  for  S .  The  judgment  subjectivist  might  say  that  a  life  segment  is  good  
for  a  person  just  in  case  she  believes  at  some  speci ed  time  and  under  the  proper  conditions  
that  it  is  good  for  herself.  On  a  di erent  approach,  the  theory  would  imply  that  a  life  segment  is  
good  for  a  person  just  in  case  there  is  a  favorable  balance  of  welfare  goods  to  welfare  bads  
accrued  during  that  period  of  time.  
  Consider  the   rst  approach.  Put  aside  the  proper-conditions  clause  for  the  moment,  
because  the  strategy  I  employ  in  section  4.2  can  be  used  to  establish  that  Felicity  would  not,  
under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  Felicitous  is  good  
for  herself  and  that  Mallory  would  not,  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  
proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  Maladious  is  good  for  herself.  What  is  of  interest  to  us  
now  is  the  fact  that  a  fully  speci ed  version  of  the  theory  on  this   rst  approach  would  have  to  
say  when  exactly  S  must  believe  (under  whatever  proper  conditions  the  theory  speci es)  that  
one  of  S ’s  life  segments  is  good  for  S .  The  main  options  are  to  require  that  S  believe  that  the  life  
segment  is  good  for  herself  before  the  life  segment  occurs,  during  the  life  segment,  or  after  the  
life  segment  ends  (or  some  combination  of  these).  Irrespective  of  the  details,  on  this  approach  
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 the  theory  implies  that  the  welfare  value  of  Felicitous  for  Felicity  is  0  provided  that  we  stipulate  
that  Felicity  does  not,  at  any  time  whatsoever ,  believe  that  Felicitous  is  good  for  herself.  
Mutatis  mutandis  with  respect  to  what  this  version  of  the  theory  implies  about  the  welfare  
value  of  Maladious  for  Mallory.  Thus,  on  this   rst  approach,  Felicitous  is  no  better  for  Felicity  
than  Maladious  is  for  Mallory.   
Now  consider  the  second  approach.  On  this  version  of  the  theory,  a  life  segment  is  
good  for  a  person  just  in  case  there  is  a  favorable  balance  of  welfare  goods  to  welfare  bads  
accrued  during  that  period  of  time.  On  this  way  of  evaluating  the  welfare  value  of  a  life  
segment,  a  life  segment  could  be  good  for  a  person  even  if  she  does  not  believe  that  it  is  good  
for  herself.  As  long  as  the  life  segment  contains  the  right  balance  of  welfare  goods  over  welfare  
bads,  then  the  life  segment  is  good  for  her.  Of  course,  according  to  judgment  subjectivism,  
whether  a  life  segment  contains  items  that  are  welfare  goods  for  S  will  depend  on  S ’s  beliefs  
about  whether  those  items  are  good  for  herself,  but  on  the  version  of  the  theory  currently  
under  consideration,  whether  the  life  segment  itself  is  good  for  S  does  not  depend  on  whether  S  
believes  that  it  is  good  for  S .     
  This  version  of  the  theory  implies  that  the  welfare  value  of  Felicitous  for  Felicity  is  0  
because  Felicity  does  not,  and  would  not  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  the  
proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself  during  that  period  of  time.  
According  to  the  theory,  Felicitous  contains  no  welfare  goods  at  all  for  Felicity.  Mutatis  
mutandis  with  respect  to  what  this  version  of  the  theory  implies  about  the  welfare  value  of  
Maladious  for  Mallory.  Thus,  irrespective  of  whether  we  take  the   rst  or  second  approach  in  
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 explaining  the  welfare  value  of  one  of  S ’s  life  segments  for  S ,  the  theory  has  the  implausible  
implication  that  Felicitous  is  no  better  for  Felicity  than  Maladious  is  for  Mallory.  19
These  three  implausible  implications  of  the  theory—that  Felicity  isn’t  bene ted  after  
becoming  a  welfare  nihilist,  that  Mallory  isn’t  harmed  after  becoming  a  welfare  nihilist,  and  
that  Felicitous  is  no  better  for  Felicity  than  Maladious  is  for  Mallory—are  devastating.  Note  
that  the  leading  theories  of  well-being  do  not  have  these  problems.  Hedonism,  the  desire  
theory,  and  objective-list  theories  can  each  account,  for  example,  for  the  fact  that  Felicity  was  
bene ted  after  she  became  a  welfare  nihilist.  The  hedonist  will  appeal  to  the  pleasure  that  
Felicity  experienced,  the  desire  theorist  will  appeal  to  the  satisfaction  of  her  desires,  and  the  
objective-list  theorist  will  appeal  to  the  relevant  objective  welfare  goods  that  Felicity  had  in  her  
life  (e.g.,  her  friendships,  the  development  of  her  talents,  and  her  achievements).  
I  have  been  assuming  that  we  should  reject  the  theory  because  it  has  the  implausible  
implications  that  I’ve  indicated.  But  why  should  that  be?  Every  extant  theory  of  well-being  has  
some  implausible  implications.  Theory  choice  is  a  complicated  matter;  we  need  to  carefully  
weigh  the  virtues  and  vices  of  a  theory  against  each  other  before  rejecting  it.  The  worry  is  that  
since  I  haven’t  assessed  all  of  judgment  subjectivism’s  virtues  and  vices,  I  am  not  entitled  to  say  
that  the  theory  should  be  rejected  on  the  basis  of  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.   
These  are  sensible  remarks.  We  certainly  shouldn’t  commit  the  mistake  of  prematurely  
rejecting  a  theory  on  the  basis  of  just  three  implausible  implications.  But  I  don’t  think  rejecting  
19  This  third  welfare-nihilist  argument  may  be  thought  to  enjoy  a  certain  advantage  over  the  previous  
two.  The  previous  arguments  depend  on  absolute  welfare  claims  (e.g.,  that  Felicity  was  bene ted  after  
she  became  a  welfare  nihilist),  whereas  this  argument  does  not.  Instead,  it  depends  on  a  purely  
comparative  welfare  claim.  So  even  if  someone  is  skeptical  about  absolute  welfare  claims,  they  can  still  
believe  that  this  third  argument  is  sound.   
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 judgment  subjectivism  on  the  basis  of  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments  is  premature.  The  
implausible  implications  that  I  attribute  to  judgment  subjectivism  are  very  implausible  
implications  about  basic  issues  that  any  theory  of  well-being  should  get  right.  Felicity  leads  a  
paradigmatically  good  life,  and  Mallory  leads  a  paradigmatically  bad  one.  If  a  theory  cannot  
deliver  the  correct  verdicts  in  these  kinds  of  cases,  then  we  should  jettison  that  theory  for  one  
that  can.  Nearly  every  extant  theory  of  well-being  can  account  for  our  intuitive  judgments  
about  Felicity’s  and  Mallory’s  welfare  after  they  became  welfare  nihilists  except  for  judgment  
subjectivism.  That’s  an  embarrassment  for  the  theory.  
 
3.  Lin’s  Objection  
Eden  Lin  has  recently  posed  an  interesting  and  formidable  challenge  to  judgment  subjectivism  
that  is  related  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.   His  objection  is  related  because  it  identi es  a  20
class  of  individuals  who  do  not  have  beliefs  about  what  is  good  or  bad  for  themselves  but  who  
can  nonetheless  be  bene ted  and  harmed.  Whereas  Lin’s  objection  is  about  newborn  babies,  
mine  is  about  welfare  nihilists.  In  this  section,  I’ll  explain  Lin’s  objection  and  Dorsey’s  reply.  
Then  I’ll  show  that  my  objection  is  superior  to  Lin’s  in  an  important  respect:  whatever  
purchase  Dorsey’s  reply  has  with  respect  to  Lin’s  objection,  a  similar  reply  is  a  non-starter  as  a  
reply  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.   
Lin  argues  against  a  theory  he  calls  “Same  World  Judgment  Subjectivism,”  which  he  
describes  as  the  view  that  “ x  is  basically  good  for  you  at  W  if  and  only  if  at  W ,  you  believe  that  
20  See  Lin  2017.   
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 x  is  basically  good  for  you.”   Lin’s  challenge  comes  in  two  steps.  First,  note  that  newborn  21
babies  do  not  have  any  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  themselves.  As  Lin  points  out,  "they  like  
some  things  and  are  averse  to  others,  and  perhaps  they  have  beliefs.  But  they  surely  do  not  have  
beliefs  to  the  e ect  that  X  is  good  for  them."   Second,  note  that  newborn  babies  can  clearly  be  22
harmed  and  bene ted.  As  Lin  writes,  the  fact  that  “a  newborn  can  have  a  positive  level  of  
welfare  [...]  implies  that  some  things  can  be  basically  good  for  it.”  Thus,  the  judgment  
subjectivist  is  apparently  wrong  that  in  order  for  something  to  bene t  a  subject,  she  must  
believe  that  it  is  good  for  herself.  
A  natural  response  would  be  to  say  that  judgment  subjectivism  applies  to  normal  
human  adults  but  that  some  other  theory  applies  to  newborn  babies.  However,  Lin  argues  that  
“if  the  view  is  restricted  in  this  way,  we  should  reject  it  [because]  if  the  view  is  true  of  normal  
adults  even  though  it  is  false  of  newborns,  then  adult  welfare  diverges  from  neonatal  welfare  in  
a  way  that  cannot  plausibly  be  explained."   Lin  asks  us  to  consider  a  newborn  baby  who  has  a  23
high  level  of  welfare.  Suppose  that  hedonism  is  the  correct  theory  of  neonatal  welfare.  Suppose  
further  that  the  newborn  baby  matures  over  time  and  develops  the  capacity  to  believe  that  
some  things  are  good  for  herself  but  that  she  does  not  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.  
Lin  describes  the  problem  as  follows:   
If  Same  World  Judgment  Subjectivism  becomes  true  of  her  at  this  point,  then  
her  welfare  drops  to  zero  (or  lower)  at  that  time—even  though  she  continues  to  
have  exactly  the  same  balance  of  pleasure  over  pain  in  virtue  of  which  she  was  
previously  high  in  welfare.  This  is  implausible.  If  those  favorable  hedonic  
21  Ibid.,  p.  357.  We  have  seen  that  the  judgment  subjectivist  need  not  accept  this  claim  because  he  might  
instead  prefer  an  idealized  version  of  the  theory.  Lin  has  an  objection  against  idealized  versions  of  the  
theory  too.  See  ibid.,  pp.  365-368  
22  Ibid.,  p.  357.  Lin  points  out  that  even  if  this  isn’t  true  of  newborns  at  this  world,  it  is  certainly  true  of  
some  newborns  at  some  possible  worlds.  That  the  theory  cannot  accommodate  our  intuitions  about  
the  welfare  of  these  merely  possible  beings  is  still  a  problem  for  the  theory.  
23  Ibid.,  p.  358.   
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 conditions  were  formerly  su cient  for  a  high  level  of  welfare,  they  are  surely  
still  su cient  for  a  slightly  positive  level  of  welfare.  For  what  could  explain  why  
they  are  suddenly  of  no  bene t  at  all?  24
 
The  judgment  subjectivist  is  thus  forced  to  accept  either  that  newborn  babies  cannot  be  
harmed  or  bene ted  or  that  there  is  a  mysterious  divergence  between  neonatal  and  normal  
human  adult  welfare.  Both  options  seem  untenable.   
In  a  recent  paper,  Dorsey  replies  by  digging  in  his  heels  and  arguing  that  the  divergence  
is  not  so  mysterious  after  all.   He  begins  with  the  common-sense  thought  that  when  25
something  is  good  for  a  welfare  subject,  it  bears  a  positively-valenced  relation  to  that  subject.  He  
calls  this  the  kinship  relation .  On  his  view,  the  kinship  relation  is  di erent  for  di erent  kinds  of  
subjects.  For  example,  the  kinship  relation  that  obtains  between  a  dog  and  the  things  that  are  
good  for  it  may  be  a  di erent  kind  of  kinship  relation  than  the  kinship  relation  that  obtains  
between  a  normal  human  adult  and  the  things  that  are  good  for  her.  Dorsey  argues  that  for  
valuers ,  the  kinship  relation  is  constructed  by  the  subject’s  valuing  attitudes;  his  view  is  that  x  
bears  the  kinship  relation  to  a  valuer,  S ,  just  in  case  S  values  x .  And,  of  course,  he  believes  that  a  
judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  is  true.  Thus,  on  Dorsey’s  view,  the  divergence  between  the  
welfare  of  newborn  babies  and  that  of  normal  human  adults  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  when  
the  former  develops  the  capacity  to  believe  that  something  is  good  or  bad  for  itself,  the  kinship  
relation  that  must  obtain  between  that  being  and  the  things  that  are  good  for  it  is  
fundamentally  altered.   
I  mention  this  dispute  between  Lin  and  Dorsey  not  to  evaluate  Dorsey’s  response  to  
Lin.  Instead,  I  mention  it  to  illustrate  the  strength  of  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.  In  reply  to  
24  Ibid.,  p.  360.  
25  See  Dorsey  2017b.  
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 Lin’s  objection,  Dorsey  argues  that  one  theory  of  well-being  applies  to  normal  human  adults  
and  that  another  applies  to  newborn  babies  on  the  grounds  that  when  a  newborn  baby  
develops  the  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  what  is  good  or  bad  for  itself,  it  becomes  a  
fundamentally  di erent  kind  of  being.  Assign  to  this  reply  whatever  degree  of  plausibility  you  
believe  it  deserves.   
It  is  plain  that  a  similar  reply  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments  is  less  plausible.  It  
cannot  be  argued  that  the  explanation  as  to  why  one  theory  of  well-being  applies  to  otherwise  
normal  human  adults  who  are  welfare  nihilists  and  another  applies  to  normal  human  adults  
who  are  not  welfare  nihilists  is  because  the  latter  have  the  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  what  is  
good  or  bad  for  themselves  whereas  the  former  do  not.  Welfare  nihilists  have  the  capacity  to  
form  beliefs  about  what  is  good  or  bad  for  themselves.   Having  the  capacity  to  form  such  26
beliefs  is  just  a  matter  of  having  the  capacity  to  come  down,  as  it  were,  one  way  or  the  other,  as  
to  whether  something  is  good  or  bad  for  themselves.  Welfare  nihilists  like  Felicity  and  Mallory  
clearly  have  this  capacity;  it’s  just  that  when  they  exercise  it,  they  come  to  believe  that  nothing  
26  A  very  natural  way  to  think  of  the  welfare  nihilist  is  as  someone  who  thinks  that  the  concept  
of  welfare  is  incoherent.  If  we  think  of  welfare  nihilism  according  to  this  model,  then  we  might  
doubt  that  the  welfare  nihilist  has  the  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  what  is  good  or  bad  for  
themselves.  Do  I,  as  someone  who  believes  that  the  concept  of  a  four-sided  triangle  is  
incoherent,  have  the  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  whether  something  is  a  four-sided  triangle?  
I’m  inclined  to  think  the  answer  is  “yes,”  but  some  readers  may  have  a  di erent  reaction.  For  
these  readers,  I  submit  that  we  need  not  understand  welfare  nihilism  according  to  this  model.  
Instead,  we  can  think  of  the  welfare  nihilist  as  someone  who  thinks  that  there  are  no  welfare  
properties  instantiated  in  this  world  but  that  there  are  some  possible  worlds  where  they  are.  
Compare:  I  am  a  nihilist  about  unicorns.  I  don’t  think  the  concept  of  being  a  unicorn  is  
incoherent;  I  simply  deny  that  there  are  any  unicorns.  It  can  hardly  be  said  that  I  haven’t  
exercised  my  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  unicorns  simply  because  I  do  not  believe  that  
anything  is  a  unicorn.  I  have  indeed  exercised  the  capacity  to  form  beliefs  about  whether  this  or  
that  thing  is  a  unicorn.  It’s  just  that,  in  each  case,  I  come  down  on  the  question  in  a  particular  
way.  For  discussion  of  these  issues  as  they  arise  in  the  context  of  morality,  see  Brown  2013  and  
Kalf  2015.  I  thank  an  anonymous  referee  for  raising  this  concern.   
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 is  good  or  bad  for  themselves.  For  this  reason,  whatever  purchase  Dorsey’s  reply  has  with  
respect  to  Lin’s  objection,  it  is  a  non-starter  as  a  reply  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.  
 
4.  Objections  and  Replies  
Each  of  the  previous  arguments  relies  on  the  general  thought  that  some  ways  that  a  welfare  
nihilist’s  life  can  go  can  be  better  or  worse  for  her  than  others.  Judgment  subjectivism  is  
implausible  because  it  implies  otherwise.  One  might  wonder,  however,  whether  it’s  really  
possible  to  be  a  welfare  nihilist  and  whether  there  are  ways  to  specify  the  theory  that  don’t  have  
the  implausible  implications  I  attribute  to  it.  To  make  the  discussion  that  follows  less  onerous,  
I’ll  formulate  each  objection  in  terms  of  the  case  of  Felicity.   
 
4.1  The  ﬁrst  objection  
You  claim  that  Felicity  believes  that  nothing  is  good  for  herself,  but  I  ﬁnd  that  diﬃcult  to  imagine.  
After  all,  Felicity  pursues  various  projects  and  engages  in  loving  relationships,  so  she  must  believe  
that  these  activities  are  good  for  herself.  Thus,  Felicity  cannot  be  a  sincere  and  consistent  welfare  
nihilist  in  the  way  that  you  suggest.  Even  if  she  sincerely  believes  that  welfare  nihilism  is  true,  she  
clearly  is  not  consistent  because  she  makes  ordinary,  everyday  judgments  about  what  is  good  for  
herself.   
I  agree  with  the  objector  that  one  possible  explanation  for  Felicity’s  behavior  is  that  she  
is  not  a  sincere  and  consistent  welfare  nihilist.  That  would  be  one  coherent  way  to   ll  in  the  
details  of  the  case.  If  Felicity  really  did  believe,  for  example,  that  being  married  to  her  husband  
is  good  for  herself,  that  fact  could  explain  why  she  got  married.  But  this  is  not  the  only  possible  
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 explanation.  There  is  another  coherent  way  to   ll  in  the  details  of  the  case  that  does  not  require  
us  to  say  that  Felicity  believes  that  something  is  good  for  herself.   
The  explanation  I  have  in  mind  appeals  to  Felicity’s  intrinsic  desires .  An  intrinsic  desire  
is  a  desire  for  something  for  its  own  sake.  Contrast  intrinsic  desires  with  mere  instrumental  
desires.  My  desire  for  money  is  a  mere  instrumental  desire;  I  want  money  because  having  
money  can  get  me  other  things  that  I  desire.  I  do  not  desire  to  have  green  slips  of  paper  in  my  
pocket  for  its  own  sake.  My  desire  for  pleasure,  however,  is  an  intrinsic  desire;  I  want  pleasure  
for  its  own  sake.  Sometimes  an  intrinsic  desire  can  also  be  an  instrumental  desire.  I  may  want  
pleasure  because  it  can  get  me  something  else  that  I  desire,  but  my  desire  for  pleasure  is  still  an  
intrinsic  desire  as  long  as  I  also  want  it  at  least  partly  for  its  own  sake.  Also,  intrinsic  desires  do  
not  depend  on  beliefs  about  value;  you  can  have  an  intrinsic  desire  for  pleasure  even  if  you  do  
not  believe  that  pleasure  is  good  for  you.   27
Now  suppose  that  Felicity  pursues  her  various  projects  and  engages  in  loving  
relationships  because  she  has  an  intrinsic  desire  for  pleasure  and  she  believes  that  pursuing  her  
various  projects  and  engaging  in  loving  relationships  will  result  in  her  experiencing  pleasure.  
Because  she  is  a  sincere  and  consistent  welfare  nihilist,  Felicity  does  not  believe  that  
experiencing  pleasure  is  good  for  herself,  but  she  wants  to  experience  pleasure  nonetheless.  
When  Felicity  gets  married,  for  example,  we  can  suppose  that  she  believes  that  doing  so  will  
result  in  her  experiencing  pleasure.  Using  this  strategy,  we  can  appeal  to  Felicity’s  intrinsic  
27  Even  the  judgment  subjectivist  would  accept  that  you  can  have  a  desire  for  something  without  
believing  that  it  is  good  for  yourself.  Otherwise,  a  judgment-based  theory  of  valuing  would  not  be  
much  of  an  alternative  to  a  desiderative  theory  of  valuing.   
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 desire  for  pleasure  (coupled  with  the  belief  that  her  behavior  will  result  in  her  experiencing  
pleasure)  to  explain  her  behavior.   
The  objector  might  insist  that  though  I  have  provided  a  possible  explanation  of  
Felicity’s  behavior  that  does  not  require  us  to  say  that  Felicity  believes  that  something  is  good  
for  herself,  I  have  not  provided  a  plausible  explanation  of  her  behavior.  Only  an  explanation  
that  says  that  Felicity  believes  that  something  is  good  for  herself  can   t  that  bill.  Or  so  the  
objector  claims.   
I  do  not  know  what  is  supposed  to  be  so  implausible  about  explaining  a  person’s  
behavior  by  appealing  to  her  intrinsic  desire  to  experience  pleasure.  But  in  order  to  respond  to  
the  current  objection,  I  don’t  need  to  argue  that  the  explanation  I  o ered  is  plausible;  it  only  
needs  to  cohere  with  the  other  details  of  the  case.  The  fact  that  Felicity  can  coherently  be  
described  as  acting  on  an  intrinsic  desire  to  experience  pleasure  (coupled  with  the  belief  that  
her  behavior  will  result  in  her  experiencing  pleasure)  is  enough  to  undermine  the  objection.  
After  all,  Felicity  is  just  a   ctional  character  in  a  thought  experiment.  As  long  as  the  story  is  
coherent,  we  can   ll  in  the  details  as  we  wish.  Thus,  by  appealing  to  Felicity’s  intrinsic  desire  to  
experience  pleasure,  we  need  not  accuse  Felicity  of  being  an  insincere  or  an  inconsistent  welfare  
nihilist  in  order  to  make  sense  of  why  she  pursues  her  various  projects  and  engages  in  loving  
relationships.   28
28  Some  hold  that  S ’s  desire  that  p  is  just  the  state  of  its  seeming  to  S  that  p  is  good.  See  Oddie  2005.  It  
might  be  thought  that  such  a  view  is  in  tension  with  my  strategy  here;  if  it  turns  out  that  Felicity’s  
intrinsic  desire  to  experience  pleasure  just  is  her  belief  that  experiencing  pleasure  is  good  for  herself,  
then  it  could  not  be  argued  that  appealing  to  Felicity’s  intrinsic  desire  for  pleasure  helps  us  explain  
various  facts  of  her  life  without  appealing  to  her  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  herself.  I  do  not  think  
this  view  is  in  tension  with  what  I  say  here  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  view  is  that  intrinsic  desires  are  
seemings,  not  that  intrinsic  desires  are  beliefs.  It  might  seem  to  S  that  p  even  if  S  does  not  believe  that  p .  
Second,  the  view  is  that  intrinsic  desires  are  seemings  about  value  simpliciter ,  not  welfare  value.  It  might  
seem  to  S  that  p  is  of  value  simpliciter  even  if  it  does  not  seem  to  S  that  p  is  good  for  S .  Thus,  even  if  we  
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4.2  The  second  objection   
Judgment  subjectivism  is  the  view  that  something  is  good  for  a  person  if  and  only  if  she  would  
believe,  under  the  proper  conditions ,  that  it  is  good  for  herself.  You  claimed  earlier,  without  
argument,  that  Felicity  would  not,  under  any  plausible  speciﬁcation  of  the  theory’s  
proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.  But  I  can  think  of  some  plausible  
ways  of  specifying  the  proper-conditions  clause  such  that  the  resulting  theory  will  not  have  the  
implication  that  you  attribute  to  it.  And  if  I  can  supply  at  least  one  such  speciﬁcation,  I  will  have  
limited  the  force  of  your  argument  in  an  important  way:  your  argument,  if  successful,  gives  us  
reason  to  reject  some  but  not  all  versions  of  judgment  subjectivism .   
I  did  indeed  claim  earlier  that  Felicity  would  not,  under  any  plausible  speci cation  of  
the  theory’s  proper-conditions  clause,  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.  I  now  need  to  
make  good  on  that  claim.  My  strategy  is  to  establish  a  presumptive  case  for  it  by  showing  how  
some  candidate  speci cations  of  the  proper-conditions  clause  fail  to  make  the  theory  immune  
to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.   
 
4.2.1  “If  she  were  fully  informed  and  fully  rational...”  
One  natural  and  plausible-sounding  strategy  is  to  specify  the  proper  conditions  as  those  of  full  
information  and  full  rationality.  The  version  of  judgment  subjectivism  that  would  result  is  as  
follows:   
think  that  Felicity’s  intrinsic  desire  to  experience  pleasure  just  is  the  state  of  it  seeming  to  her  that  
experiencing  pleasure  is  good,  that  falls  short  of  identifying  Felicity’s  intrinsic  desire  to  experience  
pleasure  with  a  belief  that  her  experiencing  pleasure  is  good  for  herself.   
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 x  is  good  for  S  if  and  only  if  S  would  believe,  if  she  were  fully  informed  
and  fully  rational,  that  x  is  good  for  S .  29
 
To  assess  this  formulation  of  the  theory,  we  have  to  say  something  about  what  “full  
information”  means  here.  Would  information  about  what  is  good  for  Felicity  be  included  
among  the  information  we  add  to  her  belief  set  when  we  make  her  fully  informed?   
Suppose  that  when  we  add  information  to  Felicity’s  belief  set  to  make  her  fully  
informed,  we  add  information  about  what  is  good  for  her.  Then  the  theory  presupposes  facts  
about  a  person’s  good  independent  of  her  beliefs  about  what  is  good  for  herself.  The  judgment  
subjectivist  tells  us  that  the  fact  that  something  is  good  for  a  person  consists  in  her  believing,  
under  the  proper  conditions,  that  it  is  good  for  herself.  But  then  we  are  told  that  these  proper  
conditions  include  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  it  is  good  for  herself.  It  would  seem  that  we  have  
an  instance  of  a  problematic  kind  of  circularity  that  the  judgment  subjectivist  should  not  be  
willing  to  accept.   
Suppose  instead  that  when  we  add  information  to  Felicity’s  belief  set  to  make  her  
“fully”  informed,  we  do  not  add  information  about  what  is  good  for  her.  In  that  case,  there  is  
no  guarantee  that  Felicity  will  believe  that  something  is  good  for  herself  under  these  
conditions.  Perhaps  this  is  where  the  condition  of  being  fully  rational  comes  into  play.  The  
29  There  are  some  reasons  to  reject  specifying  the  proper-conditions  clause  as  conditions  of  full  
information  and  full  rationality.  There  is  a  worry  that  such  idealized  conditions  are  objectionably  ad  
hoc.  See  Enoch  2005  for  a  statement  of  this  criticism  and  Sobel  2009  for  a  reply.  There  are  also  concerns  
that  no  person  could  be  fully  informed  and  that  even  if  a  person  could  be  fully  informed,  the  idealized  
perspective  may  lack  evaluative  authority.  See  Rosati  1995  for  a  statement  of  this  criticism.  More  
generally,  there  is  a  worry  that  if  a  theory  of  well-being  bestows  evaluative  authority  to  a  person’s  
counterfactual  pro-attitudes,  then  that  theory  risks  violating  the  resonance  constraint.  Such  a  theory  
might  imply,  for  example,  that  my  fully  informed  and  fully  rational  self’s  desire  to  listen  to  musak  makes  
listening  to  musak  good  for  me,  even  if  I  strongly  dislike  listening  to  musak  and  don’t  believe  that  
listening  to  it  is  any  good  for  me.  For  a  discussion  of  a  similar  alienation  worry  as  it  relates  to  some  
forms  of  moral  rationalism,  see  Joyce  2001.   
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 hope  would  be  that  it  would  in  some  sense  be  irrational  for  Felicity  to  be  “fully”  informed  and  
still  fail  to  believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.   
Suppose  that  Felicity  is  “fully”  informed  and  fully  rational  and  that  she  does  not  
believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself.  Now  the  version  of  judgment  subjectivism  currently  
under  consideration  would  imply  that  Felicity  is  thereby  irrational.  But  why  is  Felicity  
irrational  for  not  believing  that  anything  is  good  for  herself?  The  judgment  subjectivist  must  
surely  allow  that  some  things  are  not  good  for  a  person.  On  any  version  of  the  theory,  it  must  
be  rational  for  a  person  to  believe  of  some  arbitrarily  chosen  x  that  it  is  not  good  for  herself.  
But  if  a  person  can  believe  this  of  some  arbitrarily  chosen  x  and  remain  rational,  she  should  
surely  be  able  to  believe  it  of  every  x  and  remain  rational.   
But  suppose  that  I  am  wrong  about  this  and  that  it’s  really  true  that  Felicity,  if  “fully”  
informed,  is  irrational  for  believing  that  nothing  is  good  for  herself.  Consider  a  variation  of  the  
case.  This  time,  suppose  that  Felicity  has  no  opinion  about  welfare  (e.g.,  she  isn’t  a  principled  
welfare  nihilist  as  in  the  original  version  of  the  case)  and  that  she  is  “fully”  informed.  Suppose  
further  that  by  introspection  she  comes  to  hold  the  true  belief  that  she  does  not  believe  that  
anything  is  good  for  herself.  She  studies  the  well-being  literature  and  becomes  convinced  of  
judgment  subjectivism.  She  then  combines  these  two  beliefs—her  belief  that  she  does  not  
believe  that  anything  is  good  for  herself  and  her  belief  that  judgment  subjectivism  is  true—and  
deduces  that  nothing  is  good  for  herself.  The  judgment  subjectivist  cannot  say  that  in  this  
version  of  the  case  that  Felicity  is  irrational  since  each  step  of  her  reasoning  is  unassailable  by  
the  judgment  subjectivist’s  own  lights.  We  now  have  before  us  a  di erent  version  of  the  case  in  
which  Felicity  is  both  “fully”  informed  and  fully  rational,  yet  she  still  does  not  believe  that  
24 
 anything  is  good  for  herself.  The  upshot  is  that  specifying  the  proper  conditions  as  those  of  
“full”  information  and  full  rationality  does  not  make  the  theory  immune  to  the  welfare-nihilist  
arguments.   
We  can  get  di erent  versions  of  judgment  subjectivism  by  tinkering  with  the  theory’s  
proper-conditions  clause.  But  I  have  shown  that  the  theory  is  undermined  by  the  
welfare-nihilist  arguments  if  we  specify  those  conditions  to  include  a  coherence  condition,  a  
condition  of  full  consideration,  a  condition  of  full  information,  and  a  condition  of  full  
rationality.  There  may  be  other  ways  to  specify  the  proper-conditions  clause  in  an  e ort  to  
make  the  theory  immune  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments,  but  we  at  least  have  a  presumptive  
case  that  the  arguments  are  e ective  against  any  plausible  formulation  of  the  theory.   
 
5.  Conclusion  
In  this  paper,  I  have  given  three  related  arguments  against  judgment  subjectivism.  Each  
argument  is  about  how  the  theory  implies  something  implausible  about  the  welfare  of  welfare  
nihilists.  The  problematic  feature  of  the  theory  is  that  it  implies  that  something  is  good  (bad)  
for  a  person  only  if  she  believes  that  it  is  good  (bad)  for  herself.  The  welfare-nihilist  arguments  
would  be  devastating  against  any  theory  with  this  implication.  For  example,  Wayne  Sumner’s  
happiness  theory  of  well-being  is  also  subject  to  the  welfare-nihilist  arguments.  On  his  theory,  
welfare  consists  in  authentic  happiness ,  which  involves  a  cognitive  component  (in  addition  to  
an  a ective  one).  Sumner  describes  this  cognitive  component  as  “a  judgment  that,  on  balance  
and  taking  everything  into  account,  your  life  is  going  well  for  you.”   Welfare  nihilists,  of  30
course,  make  no  such  judgments,  so  Sumner’s  theory  also  has  the  implausible  implications  that  
30  See  Sumner  1996,  p.  145.  
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 I  attribute  to  the  judgment  subjectivist.  One  upshot  of  this  paper  is  that  we  should  assess  
theories  of  well-being,  at  least  in  part,  in  terms  of  whether  they  deliver  the  intuitively  correct  
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